For the analysis of communication delay, a simulated power system consisting of several generators is considered, where braking resistors (BR) [1] are used for transient stability control of the grid. The switching of the BR is implemented by a fuzzy logic controller. The specific feature of a fuzzy logic controller is that it works well in all nonlinear and imprecise situations. Since in this work we are dealing with a power network which is highly nonlinear, the fuzzy logic controller for braking resistor switching is chosen. The Total Kinetic Energy Deviation (TKED) of the generators is used as the input to the fuzzy controller for the BR switching [2] . Simulations are carried out by using Electro-Magnetic Transients Program (EMTP) [3] . The effectiveness of the fuzzy controlled braking resistor is demonstrated considering a balanced (3LG: three-phase-toground) fault at different points on the transmission lines of the network. Moreover, various values of communication delays which may be caused by natural disaster, faults or cyber attacks are considered for the transient stability analysis of the system.
II. CAUSES OF COMMUNICATION DELAYS
In order to analyze the causes of communication delays, the IEEJ West 10-machine model system [1] is considered (as shown in Fig. 1 ). This is a 10-machine tandem model that is a prototype of the Japanese 60 Hz system. It presents the long time oscillation characteristics of a tandem system. The model system has 10 generators, G1 to G10, as shown in Fig.1 . Generator G10 is considered as the swing generator. All lines in Fig.1 represent 2 circuits of 3-phase transmission line. In this work, five braking resistors are installed at the terminal busses of generators G1, G4-G6, and G10 for the stabilization of overall system [2] . Fig. 2 shows that a braking resistor BR with a conductance value of G TCSBR is connected through a thyristor switching circuit to a phase, say phase 'a', of a generator terminal bus. The switching of the BR is realized by a fuzzy logic controller. The TKED is used as the input to the fuzzy controller for BR switching. In this work, the difference between the total kinetic energy (W total ) of the generators at transient state and that at steady state is defined as TKED, i.e., TKED =(W total at transient state)(W total at steady state). The Automatic Voltage Regulator (AVR) and governor (GOV) control system models for the IEEJ West 10-machine model system have been included in the simulation. Various parameters of the generators used for the simulation are described in [1] .
A. Closed Loop Control System Associated with BR Operation Fig. 3 shows a closed-loop control system associated with the BR operation. It is noteworthy here that the delay includes both the upstream and downstream link. As shown in Fig. 3 , the speed equivalent signal of each generator is passed through a filter and an A/D converter; these digitalized signals are then sent to a central control office where a GPS receiver synchronizes the signals in a common timing reference. By using the synchronized signals, the TKED is calculated and sent as input to each fuzzy controller. In this case, signals may be transmitted and received through microwave or optical fiber.
B. Causes of Communication Delay
For the control system (in Fig. 3 ), time delays are introduced possibly due to signal transmission through optical fiber or microwave, analog-to-digital (A/D) conversion, online calculation of the TKED, and the time synchronization of signals by GPS. Such communication delays affect the circuit breaker opening and closing operations following a fault in the electric grid. Other reasons that may cause delays result from information infrastructure, which we discussed in section IV.
Usually, communication delays may range from several microseconds to few hundred milliseconds [4] [5] [6] . Again, according to some other reports [7] [8] , typically 150 to 200 milliseconds communication delay values are considered to design some actual transient stability control systems. In this work, extensive simulations are carried out with different values of communication delays. Some of the simulation cases corresponding to communication delays from 20 µsec to 500 msec are described in Section "III-A".
III. SIMULATION OF COMMUNICATION DELAY
The communication delays may affect the control logic, and consequently the performance of the overall system. So, such communication delays should be considered for the actual study of a power network. In this work, simulations are carried out considering balanced (3LG: three-phase-toground) fault at points A, F and Z on the transmission lines. In all test cases, we considered that the simulated fault occurs at 0.1sec, the circuit breakers on the faulty lines are opened at 0.17 sec, and at 1.003 sec the circuit breakers are closed. It is assumed that the circuit breaker clears the line when the current through it crosses the zero level. The time step and simulation time have been chosen as 0.00005 sec and 20.0 sec, respectively. G2  G3  G4  G5  G6  G7  G8  G9 * 60Hz, 1000 MVA base Figs. 4 (a) and (b) show the load angle responses without and with fuzzy controlled BR, respectively, in case of 3LG fault at point A. Communication delay is not considered in this case. It is seen from these responses that the system is transiently stable when the fuzzy controlled BR is used. Fig.  5 shows the load angle responses with fuzzy controlled BR (in case of 3LG fault at point A) considering a communication delay of 500 msec. It is seen that the transient stability performance in Fig. 5 is worse than that in Fig. 4 (b) . This fact indicates that the communication delay has an effect on the transient stability performance.
It is important to note here that each system has specific delay tolerance for proper functioning. Some systems can tolerate a delay of 200 msec, while other systems 300 msec. For the power system model considered in this work, if the delay exceeds 500 msec, then the system performance deteriorates, and the system becomes marginally stable. Therefore, it can be said that the maximum allowable delay for this system is 500 msec. G3 G4  G5  G6 G7, G8 G9 G10
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IV. CYBER ATTACKS CAUSING COMMUNICATION DELAYS
The backbone of the Smart Grid is the information infrastructure, which is used to communicate with different grid components. Power Industry uses different type of media such as leased lines, wide area networks/Internet, and radio/microwave to transmit data and signals among control centers and remote locations. As shown in Fig 3, GPS is used for sending/receiving information (voltages, currents, frequency and other information) to and from the central control office. These measurements/signals need to be highly synchronized and time-aligned by means of accurate GPS synchronizing clock. However, some of these communication links are vulnerable (can easily be hacked) i.e. prone to interruption and man-in-the-middle cyber attacks. Also an unauthorized access and the interception of such communication channels may inject false signal to disrupt the supervisory control system (SCADA) resulting instability in the power system. While Smart Grid technologies adopted encryption and authentication mechanism for information and signal exchange, such security measures also introduce delays and need to be considered [9] [10] Among many cyber defense measures, power industry needs to define proper security policy, deploy real-time monitoring such as advanced Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), and share cyber incident data with various organizations in order to respond in a timely and coordinated fashion.
V.
CONCLUSION
The deployment of Smart Grid technologies such as advanced sensing and measurements, require extensive information infrastructure for two-way communication at all levels of electric power grid -generation, transmission, distribution and consumer components/field units. These communication requirements include latency, bandwidth, reliability and security for enhanced information exchange and minimize signaling delays. This paper analyzes the causes and effects of communication delays in an example electric grid system. From the simulation results of balanced fault at different points in the power network, the following conclusions can be drawn.
(a) The fuzzy logic-controlled braking resistor is effective in improving the transient stability. However, the communication delay associated with the online calculation of the input to the fuzzy controller has an influence on the transient stability performance.
(b) Command and Communication delays caused by cyber attacks need to be handled through use of monitoring and response tools, and traffic flow analysis.
In our future study, we will look into how the delays can be prevented resulting from all types of faults failure and cyber attacks. 
